Abstract-Secure multicast over wireless networks is an important and challenging goal because of widespread deployment of wireless networks and the need of multicast. In this paper, we propose a new method to generate and distribute keys for multicast security function. In existing key management protocols, after join or leave a node, key regeneration and distribution is needed to provide multicast security. In our distinctive method, each node that joins the multicast group has a different decryption key with other multicast group members. Therefore key regeneration and distribution is not needed due to new node joining or leaving, which can significantly minimize the number of transmission and storage requirements required for re-key of the multicast group. It also provides protection against data tampering after node leaving. At the end the implementation of this method has been done on the real time network test-bed and the real obtained results show the efficiency of the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of multicast security is to provide authentication and secrecy for group communication. Trusted senders should send packets to the group and only authenticated receivers should receive packets destined to multicast group.
The Multicast SECurity group (MSEC) [1] has defined a common architecture for key management protocols. It supports application, transport and network layer security protocols. It focused on group security association, key management for multicast based on group control or key server model.
Most of researchers have focused on the group key management and distribution which are the most important part of group security. With strong secure key management and distribution protocol, we can have a safe communication.
In this paper, a new multicast security method is proposed. The focused is given on key generation and distribution for group communication to overcome the problem of unsecured key generation and distribution, repeating key generation and distribution, data tampering after a node leaving, and reducing the required bandwidth due to key updating.
The organized of this paper is as follow: section II presents the background of multicast IPv6 security. The new security method, and test-bed architecture and implementation are presented in section III, followed by results, discussion and conclusion.
II. MULTICAST IPV6 SECURITY Multicast communications have been used for emerging Internet applications such as Internet-based education, video conferencing, and real time information services. Authorized participants should only be allowed access to group communications. The group key should be newly updated when a new member joins or leaves the multicast group [2] .
All members can use one key from central key distribution centre. This reduces system performance due to key changing process. Some of the existing methods are suffering from the delay of the re-key and re-distribution process [3] .
The security architecture for the internet protocol [4] provides security services for traffic at the IP layer. It defined manually keyed transport mode IP Security (IPSec) association support for IP packets with a multicast address in the IP destination address field and did not defined the interaction of IPSec with a group key management protocol [4] , [5] .
The IPSec security services are applied to IP multicast packets. These extensions are relevant only for IPSec implementation that supports multicast [5] . There is a concern regarding to the performance of IPSec. For security functions like IPSec, the required processing power is very large [6] and many users would not have enough throughputs.
In some cases the member may be allowed to access past data after joining the group and may have access to future data at a later time after leaving the group. The different approaches to group re-keying can be classified into 3 classes [7] . Centralized, distributed subgroup and distributed methods. The entire group is controlling by a single entity in the centralized method. The failure of central entity causes the entire group to become insecure. In the distributed subgroup, different controllers can be used because a large group is split into small subgroups. In distributed method, all members can perform access control. It may not be safe to leave to any member to generate new keys. Key generation requires secure mechanisms that may not be available to all members.
III. SUGGESTED METHOD AND TEST-BED ARCHITECTURE
The proposed security method is based on key generation and distribution in multicast IPv6 networks. The aim is to design a secure and quality traffic-improved for multicast IPv6. Instead of group key generation, we proposed a method to generate different keys for the group. Therefore re-key process is not needed when a new node join or leave the multicast group. It can eliminate the problem of re-key updating, attacks against group key, unsafe data transmission, and reuse of the key after a node leaves the group before rekey process. When a node wishes to join the multicast group, it sends MLDv2 join message to the multicast router (MR). Then this message will be forwarded to the multicast server. The node receives the acknowledgement from multicast server. At this time, synchronization will be done between the node and MR, and MR generates a unicast random key and forwards to the node. This process is done very quickly. Parallelly MR creates or updates the list of member group.
When MR receives a multicast stream from multicast server, it forwards to the group with different encryption keys. When a node leaves the group, the MR only delete the entry for that particular node and key, so regeneration of the group key is not needed anymore. MR encapsulated the multicast stream from IP layer to unicast MAC layer packets and sends to the all members to solve the difficulty of using different key encryption. Fig. 1 shows the summary of the work procedure of the proposed method. Fedora Core 5 and 7 were used as operating systems during test-bed implementation because of compatibility with MIPL to run Mobile IPv6. Table 1 describes the test-bed components with required software and hardware. Figure 2 shows the architecture and design of the test-bed for proposed method. The implemented test-bed consists of five PCs. One PC acts as Multicast Server (MS) to send multicast stream and one PC act as Multicast Router (MR) to forward the received stream from server to multicast group. Three of them assume the roles of the multicast group members, acting as multicast receivers.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The performance of secured multicast IPv6 system was measured from real time test-bed in this section. Two scenarios were examined and the obtained results were analyzed in the case of adding secure system and without this system.
First scenario is based on existing method which normal key management protocol is used. Three mobile nodes join multicast group and receive the same key encryption and multicast stream from the server. In the second scenario, the mobile nodes join the multicast group but receive different keys and unicast MAC layer packets instead of multicast. However end-to-end multicasting is provided.
Linux operating system on multicast router has to be patched with IPv6 multicast forwarding patch to provide IPv6 multicast forwarding. Fig. 3 shows the multicast forwarding and routing in multicast router. It can be seen that the procedure is started and the packets are received. To receive a multicast stream, each node needs to send Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) join message to the multicast router. After receiving acknowledgement, the join process will be done. Fig. 4 shows that mobile node has joined the multicast group. It has received a key decryption to decrypt the multicast packets. This key is different with the other node's keys. Fig. 5 shows that mobile node is connected to the Access Point (AP) and can receive the data from multicast router via AP. 6 shows the delay of key distribution process in existing key management protocol and proposed security system at the beginning of process before any node joining or leaving. As it can be seen, the average delay in proposed method and existing one are 15.72 ms and 9.42 ms respectively. Due to unicast random key generation in proposed method, the differences between insecure and secure methods is average 6.30 ms which does not effect to the whole efficiency while is only the delay of the beginning key management process. Fig. 7 shows the key distribution delay in both methods when a new node joins the group. The same key distribution delay can be considered when a new node leaves the group. In existing method with increasing the number of node leaving or joining, the delay is increased because of regeneration and distribution process. As it can be seen, the delay is not increased in proposed security system after any new node join or leave the group. V. CONCLUSIONS This paper has provided a description of an implemented test-bed for the evaluation of new security method in multicast IPv6 networks. The distinctive proposed method can easily solve the problem of unsecured key management protocols in such networks by using different unicast key for each member of multicast group. The end-to-end multicasting is provided by encapsulating multicast IP packets to unicast MAC layer packets to prevent the problem of using different key encryption for group members. This method can significantly protect data from harmful attackers. The real time implemented test-bed shows the efficiency of the proposed method.
